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Several US states are enacting 'right-to-die' laws, in the wake of the Karen Quinlan case. But the way such a law is drafted may cast doubt on a patient's existing common law right to control all aspects of his own treatment; it may give legal sanction to a lower standard of medical care that society at present expects from doctors; and it may lead to conflict between the patient's directive and his doctor's clinical judgement which cannot readily be resolved.
The laws themselves are categorised as a) legalising active killing or b) defining rights of patients to control treatment or c) assigning to others the rights to control treatment where the patient is not competent. The California law is discussed critically. The conclusion is that such legislation is not a satisfactory answer to the ethical problem of euthanasia.
Legislation to permit individuals to direct the conditions for their own terminal care has become so commonplace as to blunt our sensibilities to the original rationale for legal action, and more importantly, to minimise our willingness to criticise the desirability of such laws. Fully 85 different legislative acts have been proposed or acted on within the United States, and more may be expected. Such a definition excludes those very situations where treatment refusal is normally acceptable: for instance, the person in chronic kidney failure who is receiving agonising haemodialysis -precisely because, though critically ill, the person will not become terminal until several days have elapsed following withdrawal of dialysis.
The major flow with California's legislation is that it undermines the very principle which-right-to-dielegislation is intended to uphold to the greatest extent: patient autonomy. By denying the right to terminate treatment to all but the very most terminally ill person, it excludes the right to elect conditions for treatment for those for whom death is not imminent. In contrast, the Alabama legislature introduced a bill in I976 which would permit a person to specify conditions which are consonant with his own moral and religious beliefs. The Alabama bill does not limit its applicability to conditions where the patient will die regardless of the treatment proferred: instead, it offers any 'individual over the age of nineteen the prerogative of instructing any physician to cease or refrain from medical or surgical treatment during possible prestated future states of competency as long as such demands do not result in undue harn to society as judged by court decision.' In this last sense, the Alabama bill, of all those offered in the US, comes closest to recognising the critical problem of all allowing-to-die legislation.
No legislation should be accepted unless it accords with the fundamental beliefs of the persons affected by it. In a pluralistic society that end is difficult at best. Unless every piece of allowing-todie legislation provides for the law to be checked constantly against the legal benchmark of society's basic institutions, it opens the door to undue rigidity and abuse. Society needs to grapple with the weighty problems of the dying patient. But legislation can be a smokescreen for the real problems of the dying patienit: inadequate care, incomplete tretment and the shameful absence of loving and caring persons at the bedside. i) 'At bottom then, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits the infliction of uncivilised and inhuman punishments. The State, even as it punishes, must treat its members with respect for their intrinsic worth as human beings. A punishment is "cruel and unusual", therefore, if it does not comport with human dignity.' at 270. 2) 'The primary principle is that a punishment must not be so severe as to be degrading to the dignity of human beings.' 3) '[T]he State must not arbitrarily inflict a severe punishment. This principle derives from the notion that the State does not respect human dignity when, without reason, it inflicts upon some people a severe punishment that it does not inflict upon others.' 4) 'A third principle inherent in the Clause is that a severe punishment must not be unacceptable to contemporary society. Rejection by society, of course, is a strong indication that a severe punishment does not comport with human dignity.' 5) ' The final principle inherent in the Clause is that a severe punishment must not be excessive. A punishment is excessive under this principle if it is unnecessary: The infliction of severe punishment by the State cannot comport with human dignity when it is nothing more than pointless infliction of suffering.' at 271, 274, 277 and 279.
